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A. A Response 
In November 2014, Idaho Law Review published an article by Scott 
W. Reed entitled, How and Why Idaho Terminated Term Limits.1 Know-
ing of Mr. Reed’s historical involvement in the state court litigation 
challenging the 1994 term-limit initiative, and legislative repeal, I was 
initially pleased to know Idaho’s term-limit adoption and repeal history 
would be preserved.  
After reading Mr. Reed’s article, I believed there was plenty of aca-
demic and historical room for varied opinions and comments, since Ida-
ho’s term limit history is so messy. This response does not seek to deni-
grate Mr. Reed’s perspective or experience. Rather, this article is in-
tended to provide my insider’s point of view, provide a contrasting inter-
pretation, and make limited important corrections. 
In 2002, I was in my second term in the Idaho Senate, serving in 
leadership as Senate Majority Caucus Chairman. I voted to repeal term 
limits. I voted to override Governor Dirk Kempthorne’s veto. Within 
twenty-four days of the veto override, the 2002 election cycle began with 
the filing of declarations of candidacy.2 I, like others, had to defend my 
unpopular vote in a vigorously contested primary and general election. 
Amid allegations of thumbing noses at term-limit supporters, pro-
tecting self-interests, and improperly clutching elected positions, the 
Idaho legislature returned home to ask primary and general election 
voters to send them back to office.3 
                                                       
 
 
 1. Scott W. Reed, How and Why Idaho Terminated Term Limits, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 
1 (2014). 
 2. The veto override occurred on February 1, 2002, and the filing of declarations of 
candidacy began on February 25, 2002. See Michael Janofsky, Idaho Legislature Repeals 
Term Limit Law, Undoing Voter-Approved Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/02/us/idaho-legislature-repeals-term-limit-law-undoing-
voter-approved-measure.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); see also Election Laws of the State 
of Idaho, IDAHO SEC’Y OF ST. (2015), 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/Law/Election%20Laws.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (ex-
plaining in IDAHO CODE § 34-704 that declarations of candidacy must be filed beginning on 
the twelfth Monday until the tenth Friday preceding the primary election, and explaining in 
IDAHO CODE § 34-106 that the primary election is held the third Tuesday in May). 
 3. See, e.g., Don Morgan & Dennis Mansfield, Voters will fight back with ballot, 
IDAHO STATESMAN, February 10, 2002. (“The Legislature’s complete and utter disregard for 
the voters’ will on an issue like term limits dramatically shows why, in fact, term limits are 
needed.”); Don Morgan, As ‘hired help,’ Legislature has no right to trump voters, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, May 7, 2002. (“So, what would have been the honorable way for career politi-
cians in the Legislature and the county courthouses to advance their anti-term limits agen-
da? They should have, once again, gone back to the people and asked, that’s how…[b]ut in-
stead, a handful of career power-brokers imposed their will on the public, ignoring two votes 
of the people.”). 
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The “how” and the “why” of Mr. Reed’s article are significant histor-
ical questions, but neither of those questions were answered from my 
insider’s perspective. This article, however, will attempt to do so. 
B. A Messy History 
On a Saturday in June 2000, I attended the Idaho Republican Par-
ty’s biennial convention in Pocatello, Idaho.4 The keynote speaker was 
the iconic Charlton Heston, who was then president of the National Ri-
fle Association.5 At the convention, the fervent Heston challenged those 
present to be true to constitutional principles and stick to their guns – 
firmly shoving a rifle in the air – and with bold methodical cadence de-
clared, “from my cold, dead, hands . . . .” 
Only Republicans heard Mr. Heston that night, but two competing 
factions heeded the admonition. One significant issue separating the 
two was a proposed platform plank opposing term limits.6 
In the years leading up to that convention, term limits enjoyed 
strong support in Idaho among populists and libertarians,7 some Demo-
cratic legislators,8 and many Republican legislators.9 In spite of this or-
                                                       
 
 
 4. Mark Warbis, Idaho Republicans Seek to End Term Limits, THE SPOKESMAN-
REV., June 25, 2000, at B3. 
 5. Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7. The first effort to impose term limits by ballot measure in Idaho was begun just 
days after the 1992 election by supporters of Ross Perot, an Independent candidate for presi-
dent that year who came in an historically strong third place in Idaho in the general election. 
See Perot Supporters Launch Term-Limit Drive, THE SPOKESMAN-REV., Nov. 21, 1992, at B2. 
  Out-of-state libertarian influences came later, when wealthy Libertarian Party 
backer Howie Rich founded U.S. Term Limits in 1992 and sent resources to Idaho. See JOHN 
DAVID RAUSCH, JR. ET AL., THE TEST OF TIME: COPING WITH LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS 225, 
226 (Rick Farmer, John David Rausch, Jr. & John C. Green eds. 2003); Term-limit Backers 
Campaign in Idaho, MOSCOW-PULLMAN DAILY NEWS, Sept. 30, 1993, at 4A. 
  While populists and libertarians might occasionally occupy concurrent circles 
with Republicans, they are identifiably distinct movements. The role of these two term limit 
proponents is discussed in greater detail infra Part III.B. 
 8. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL 51, 2d Sess., at 213 (Idaho 1992) (three Democratic state 
senators voted for S.J. Res. 108, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. (Idaho 1992)); H. JOURNAL 51, 2d Sess., 
at 335 (Idaho 1992) (eight Democratic state senators voted for S.J. Memorial 116, 51st Leg., 
2d Sess. (Idaho 1992)). 
 9. See id. The first pieces of term limits legislation introduced in 1992 in the Idaho 
Legislature were S.J. Res. 108, which would have amended the Idaho Constitution limiting 
executive branch terms to two and legislative terms to five, but failed to garner even a simple 
majority in the Idaho Senate. The other was S.J. Memorial 116, which was adopted and 
called on the United State House of Representatives and Senate to amend the Constitution 
to limit terms in Congress. S.J. Memorial 116 was sponsored by Senate President Pro Tem-
pore Michael D. Crapo, a Republican, and S.J. Res. 108 was co-sponsored by Senator Jerry 
Thorne, a Republican, and Senator Claire Wetherell, a Democrat. The large majority of aye 
votes for each were Republicans.  
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ganized political effort, it was Idaho voters who inserted term limits in 
Idaho Code with an initiative in 1994.10 
At the June 2000 Republican convention, delegates ultimately 
chose a platform plank that supported the repeal of term limits.11 Con-
vention delegate Dean Haagenson, former state legislator and the spon-
sor of the repeal plank, acknowledged “[T]he people have spoken,” refer-
ring to the 1994 Initiative. But, then he added, “[t]hey were wrong.”12 
At that time, the finality of the term limit voter initiative was un-
clear and uncertain. Would the Idaho Supreme Court overturn the law? 
Would term limits be implemented? Would term limits bar a significant 
percentage of Idaho’s county, municipal, and school board officials from 
appearing on the ballot? 
Ultimately,  the Idaho legislature repealed the 1994 Initiative in 
2002.13 In doing so, Idaho became the first state to repeal term limits, 
and to date remains the only state legislature to repeal term limits im-
posed by ballot initiative.14 
The eight-year course of events from term-limit enactment in 1994 
to repeal in 2002 is a tightly-bound law-making lesson wrapped up in 
one single political issue. Idaho’s term-limit history touched every step of 
the law-making and review process: legislative, executive, judicial, and 
at the ballot box. The legislative steps involved a successful initiative, 
legislative repeal, gubernatorial veto, legislative veto override, unsuc-
cessful referendum, and a legal constitutional challenge in both the 
state District Court and Idaho Supreme Court.15 
By ballot initiative in 1994, Idaho voters codified term limits on 
state constitutional officers, state legislators, county officials, city coun-
cilors and mayors, school board trustees, and others.16 In 1995, the U.S. 
Supreme Court overturned state-imposed term limits as applied to Con-
gress.17 Then-Idaho District Court Judge N. Randy Smith determined 
Idaho term limits were facially unconstitutional in 2000,18 but on De-
cember 13, 2001 the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the District Court, 
holding term limits constitutional.19 
                                                       
 
 
 10. 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 1371–73. 
 11. Warbis, supra note 4. 
 12. Id. 
 13.  See infra Part III.E. 
 14. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS., The Term-Limited States, NCSL.ORG (Mar. 3, 
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2015). 
 15. Former Senator Joseph Stegner first brought this observation to my attention. 
 16. See 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws, supra note 10. 
 17. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 779–80 (1995). 
 18. Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 38 P.3d 598, 602, 136 Idaho 560,  564 (2001). 
 19. Id. at 609, 136 Idaho at 571. 
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In 2002, the Idaho Legislature passed H425 repealing term limits 
for all elected officials in the state.20 Days later, the governor vetoed the 
bill.21 Both houses of the legislature overrode the governor’s veto.22 And 
then a referendum to overturn the legislature’s enactment of H425 was 
placed on the ballot, but voters approved the term-limit repeal.23 
This article will explain the mechanics of ballot measures in Idaho 
focusing specifically on term limits, from initiative to referendum. It will 
then discuss the progression of term limits in Idaho—from introduction, 
to enactment, to rejection. Finally, this article will explain how and why 
the 1994 term limits initiative was repealed. 
With the assistance of former legislators and others involved in the 
events,24 I wrote this article according to my perspective and experience 
as a legislator, and I seek to supplement the record, offer another point 
of view, and make corrections to the historical record.25 
II. BALLOT MEASURES IN IDAHO 
A. Idaho & Initiated Constitutional Amendments 
To understand term-limit repeal, readers must know enactment 
limitations on ballot measures. Other than by state constitutional con-
vention,26 Idaho’s constitution can only be amended by: (i) the passage of 
a joint resolution that proposes an amendment by a two-thirds vote of 
                                                       
 
 
 20. H.B. 425, 56th Leg., 2d Sess. (Idaho 2002). 
 21. H. JOURNAL 56, 2d Sess., at 81–82 (Idaho 2002). 
 22. Ch. 1, 2002 Idaho Sess. Laws 3. 
 23. See Idaho Initiative History, IDAHO SEC’Y OF ST. 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/inithist.htm (last visited April 10, 2016) (“Term limits 
remain repealed” by a vote of 50.2% yes and 49.8% no.). 
 24. I express my gratitude to former legislators Bruce C. Newcomb, Celia Gould, 
Robert L. Geddes, Joseph Stegner, and Kent Kunz who served when H425 was passed and 
the veto overridden, as well as Gary Moncrief, distinguished professor emeritus at Boise 
State University, and Steve Ahrens, who all shared their personal recollections and provided 
valuable insight. 
 25. The impetus for this article comes from reading Scott Reed’s article, see supra 
note 1. Mr. Reed passed away while I was researching and drafting. I join with his family 
and the community of Coeur d’Alene in honoring his long legal career and civic-mindedness. 
Mr. Reed played a significant role in Rudeen as counsel for the Idaho Association of Counties. 
Although I respect his legal contribution, I disagree with some of his analysis of legislative 
motives in repealing term limits. In part, he appears to suggest that the repeal was based on 
the notion that when term limits were about to affect Republican legislative leaders, they 
forced a repeal of the popular will of the people to maintain their position in power. (In addi-
tion, Mr. Reed’s article contains some imprecisions, such as misstating party and office affili-
ation for some of the participants.) 
 26. A state constitutional convention must be called by the legislature. IDAHO 
CONST. art. XX, § 3. 
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both houses of the legislature;27 and (ii) ratification by a simple majority 
vote of the people at the next general election.28 Unlike some states, 
Idaho’s constitution provides no procedure for direct amendment by ini-
tiative.29 In other words, the initiative process in Idaho can only be used 
to create statute and cannot be used to amend the State Constitution. 
The first three states—California, Colorado, and Oklahoma—
adopted legislative term limits by initiated constitutional amendments 
in 1990.30 Currently, fifteen states maintain legislative term limits.31 
Maine is the only state with legislative term limits in statutes instead of 
the state constitution.32 Louisiana, which also prohibits direct initiative 
amendments to its Constitution, is the only state to impose legislative 
term limits by its legislature.33 Oregon remains the only state to have 
passed an initiated constitutional amendment and later have the provi-
sion removed.34 
B. Idaho & Directly Initiated Statutes 
Though lacking a mechanism to amend the Idaho Constitution sole-
ly at the ballot box, Idaho voters do have the “power to propose laws and 
enact the same at the polls,” which lawmaking right was added to Ida-
ho’s Constitution in 1912.35 Some states have an indirect initiative pro-
cess, where an initiative is placed on the ballot, voted on by the people, 
and if it is supported by a majority, then the initiative is presented for 
                                                       
 
 
 27. IDAHO CONST. art. XX, §§ 1–4. 
 28. IDAHO CONST. art. XX, § 1. 
 29. IDAHO CONST. art. XX, §§ 1–4.  
 30. The Term-Limited States, supra note 14.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS., Frequently Asked Questions About Term Limits, 
NCSL.ORG, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/about-state-legislatures/frequently-asked-questions-about-term-limits.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
 34. See Marjorie Taylor, Background Brief on Term Limits, LEGIS. COMM. SERVS. 
(May 2004), 
https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/citizen_engagement/Reports/2004EJ_Term_Limits.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (explaining that Ballot Measure 3 was approved in the November 
1992 general election, yet provisions were overturned by Lehman v. Bradbury for violating 
the “single subject rule”); see also Lehman v. Bradbury, 37 P.3d 989, 1000–01 (OR. 2002) 
(holding that federal term limits and state office term limits were separate subjects because 
federal offices were not mentioned in the Oregon Constitution before the amendment in 
question, but state offices were, therefore the amendment was void in its entirety for failure 
to follow the single-subject rule for constitutional amendments). 
 35. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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legislative approval.36 However, under Idaho’s Constitution, voters can 
directly write or amend statutes “independently from the legislature.”37 
There are, however, limitations on the power to enact laws at the 
ballot box. An initiated statute is not allowed to “violate any constitu-
tional provision of the United States or of the State of Idaho.”38 Since 
the voters’ power is derived from the same source as the legislature, it is 
subject to the same constitutional prohibit-tions.39 Initiated statutes 
have “equal footing” with legislative acts and do not have “any more 
force or effect” simply because they come directly from the people.40 Ad-
ditionally, the Idaho Legislature has no constitutional or statutory limi-
tation on amending or repealing an initiated statute.41 
Although the initiative and referendum process was authorized in 
the 1912 amendment to Idaho’s constitution, there was no enabling leg-
                                                       
 
 
 36. See Comparison of Statewide Initiative Processes, Initiative & Referendum Inst., 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/docs/A_Comparison_of_Statewide_IandR_Processes.pdf (last 
visited May 25, 2016) (explaining that nine states allow for indirect initiatives, which in-
cludes two (Utah and Washington) that allow for statutory initiatives through the direct and 
indirect process. The seven other states are: Alaska, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Neva-
da, Ohio, and Wyoming). 
 37. See IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 38. State v. Finch, 315 P.2d 529, 530, 79 Idaho 275, 276 (1957) (dealing with the 
Idaho Dredge Mining Protection Act, which was an initiative approved by Idaho voters in the 
1954 general election. When describing the facts, the court notes, “Initiative legislation is of 
the same force and effect as that enacted by both houses of the legislature and approved by 
the governor, and must not violate any constitutional provision of the United States or of the 
State of Idaho” (citing Luker v. Curtis, 136 P.2d 978, 64 Idaho 703 (1943)). However, a con-
stitutional challenge to a proposed initiated statute that has qualified for the statewide bal-
lot, but has not yet been voted on, is not ripe for judicial review and does not present a justi-
ciable controversy until enactment. Noh v. Cenarrusa, 53 P.3d 1217, 1222, 137 Idaho 798, 
803 (2002). Before drawing a bright line in Noh, the court did review challenges to proposed 
initiated statutes that had qualified for the ballot. For an interesting analysis of when the 
Supreme Court might still entertain a preemptive strike on a proposed initiatied statute, see 
the conclusion of former Chief Justice Gerald Schroeder’s article The Scope of a Premptive 
Strike in Initiative Law 44 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 18 (2007). 
 39. Westerberg v. Andrus, 757 P.2d 664, 670, 114 Idaho 401, 407 (1988) (citing 
Luker v. Curtis, 136 P.2d 978, 979, 64 Idaho 703, 704 (1943)) (A 1986 initiative passed with 
60% voter approval to create a state lottery. From adoption of the constitution in 1890 until 
1988, IDAHO CONST. art III, § 20 prohibited the legislature from creating a state lottery. 
Westerberg held that an initiative was subject to the same constitutional restraints as the 
legislature. Months after the decision, Idaho voters narrowly approved the repeal of the lot-
tery prohibition at issue in Westerberg.). 
 40. Luker, 136 P.2d at 979, 64 Idaho at 704. 
 41. Amending or repealing an initiated statute is called “legislative tampering.” 
California prohibits the legislature from amending or repealing an initiated statute without 
submitting the change to the voters. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10. Other states, like Alaska, re-
quire a certain time to lapse before amending or repealing an initiated statute. ALASKA 
CONST. art. XI, § 6. Others, like Nebraska, require a supermajority to repeal or amend an 
initiated statute. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2. Idaho has no restrictions on legislative action on 
initiated statutes. See IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1; IDAHO CODE § 34-1801, et seq. 
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islation until 1933.42 The 1933 act imposed a minimum threshold for 
signatures from registered voters to gain ballot access.43 The threshold 
at that time required signatures from at least ten percent of the total 
number of votes cast in the previous gubernatorial race.44 Over time, 
that requirement became more and more permissive, resulting in an 
increased number of initiated statutes on the ballot in the 1980s and 
1990s.45 However, the trend reversed course in 1997, when a geographic 
component was added.46 The 1997 law required signatures from six per-
cent of registered voters in at least twenty-two Idaho counties to sign a 
petition. The additional geographic requirement was then struck down 
for its unequal treatment of voters, specifically due to population vari-
ance in Idaho counties. However, that Ninth Circuit opinion, in dicta, 
proposed that legislative districts might provide a constitutionally via-
ble geographic alternative.47 Legislative districts keep relatively equal 
populations since they are redrawn decennially.48 In 2013, the Idaho 
                                                       
 
 
 42. Ch. 210, § 5, 1933 Idaho Sess. Laws 341, 434 [herein 1933 Act]. The process for 
municipalities of a certain size to conduct ballot measures was enacted almost immediately 
after adoption of the 1912 amendment. See Brian Kane, If the Citizens Speak, Listen: Idaho’s 
Local Initiative Process, 50 THE ADVOCATE 17 (2007). 
 43. 1933 Act, supra note 42, at § 5 (which states: “After the form of the initiative or 
referendum petition has been approved by the Secretary of State as in this Act provided 
same shall be printed by the person or persons or organization or organizations under whose 
authority the measure is to be referred or initiated or circulated in the several counties of the 
state for the signatures of legal voters. Before such petitions shall be entitled to final filing 
and consideration by the Secretary of State there shall be affixed thereto the signatures of 
legal voters equal in number to not less than ten per cent (10%) of the electors of the state 
based upon the aggregate vote cast for Governor at the general election next preceding the 
filing of such initiative or referendum.”). 
 44. IDAHO CODE § 34-1805 (1981) (amended 1997, 2007, and 2013). 
 45. Governors in Idaho had two-year terms until 1946. Elections for governor have 
been conducted every four years since 1946 in even years between presidential elections. 
Since 1980, turnout in presidential elections has remained relatively flat, while turnout in 
off-year general elections has declined by as much as 20 points. Declining participation in 
gubernatorial elections had the effect of lowering the number of signatures necessary rela-
tive to the number of registered voters. See Idaho General Election Registration and Turnout 
1980 – 2012, IDAHO SEC’Y OF ST., http://www.sos.idaho.gov/ELECT/VoterReg/Vtrrghst.htm 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2016).  
 46. IDAHO CODE § 34-1805 (1997) (amended 2007 and 2013), invalidated in part by 
Idaho Coal. United for Bears v. Cenarrusa, 342 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). Idaho Code § 
34-1805 (1997) added that the petition for initiative “must contain a number of signatures of 
qualified electors from each of the twenty-two (22) counties equal to not less than six percent 
(6%) of the qualified electors at the time of the last general election in each of those twenty-
two (22) counties.” Later amendments removed the geographic component after Idaho Coal. 
United for Bears ruled that the language violated the Equal Protection Clause by giving 
rural voters preferential treatment.  
 47. Idaho Coal. United For Bears, 342 F.3d at 1078. 
 48. See Bingham Cnty. v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863, 865, 
137 Idaho 870, 872 (2002) (A legislative district that deviates by more than 10% at the time 
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legislature enacted this judicial suggestion, and it is still in force to-
day.49 
Six states have repealed term limits.50 Of those six, all but one of 
those states had codified term limits only in statute.51 The highest ap-
pellate court in three states—Massachusetts, Washington, and Wyo-
ming—overturned term limit statutes on the grounds that statutes can-
not alter qualifications for state office.52 In 1994 the Utah legislature 
imposed twelve-year term limits to avoid a more restrictive initiative, 
but in 2003, three years before the effective date and one year after Ida-
ho’s successful repeal, the Utah Legislature repealed their statute.53 
C. Idaho’s Referendum Process 
The same 1912 Idaho constitutional amendment that granted the 
right to legislate by initiative, also granted the right to demand a refer-
endum, or “the power to approve or reject at the polls any act or measure 
passed by the legislature.”54 Also called a veto referendum or a popular 
referendum, a referendum reserves to voters the ability to repeal or ac-
cept a law enacted by the legislature. The same signature requirements 
exist to place an initiative and a referendum on the ballot, but the req-
uisite signatures for a referendum must be turned in to the Secretary of 
State within sixty days of adjournment sine die of the legislative session 
that passed “the bill on which the referendum is demanded.”55  
Historically, it was not clearly defined what constituted an “act or 
measure.”56 Generally a referendum was the submission of any act of a 
                                                                                                                                
 
 
the map is drawn  is prima facie discriminatory. This is understood to mean plus or minus 
5% from the ideal.). 
 49. IDAHO CODE § 34-1805 (6% of registered voters statewide and 6% of registered 
voters in at least 18 legislative districts). 
 50. See NAT’L CONF. OF State LEGS., The Term-Limited States, NCSL.ORG, (Mar. 
13, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-
states.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2016) (noting that Idaho, Massachusetts, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming have all repealed term limits). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See League of Women Voters v. Sec’y of the Commw., 681 N.E.2d 842, 847 
(Mass. 1997); Gerberding v. Munro, 949 P.2d 1366, 1377–78 (Wash. 1998); Maxfield v. State, 
294 P.3d 895, 902–04 (Wyo. 2013); Cathcart v. Meyer, 88 P.3d 1050, 1067 (Wyo. 2004). Ore-
gon repealed its term limit law in 2002 through the state supreme court. The Court ruled 
that the initiative imposing term limits violated the single-subject requirement for initia-
tives, and was therefore unconstitutional.  
 53. S.B. 240, 2003 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2003); see also Todd Donovan, Direct De-
mocracy As “Super-Precedent”?: Political Constraints of Citizen-Initiated Laws, 43 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 191, 205 (2007) 
 54. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 55. See supra Part II.B.; IDAHO CODE § 34-1803. 
 56. See IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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legislative body (legislature, county commission, or city council) to the 
people to approve or reject an act, while an initiative was a proposal for 
a law that originated from the people to be voted upon directly by the 
people.57 In the past, the Idaho Supreme Court explained if the subject 
is legislative in nature, it was subject to a referendum, and when the 
subject was administrative in nature, it was not.58 But the Court later 
recognized the complexity of this determination, and allowed the initia-
tive or referendum process to play out regardless of whether it is an act 
or measure.  This approach acknowledges that the intiative power is a 
constitutional mandate, enabling voters to address matters of concern 
without semantic obstacles.59 
D. The Idaho Legislature & Advisory Questions 
Infrequently, the Idaho legislature has asked advisory questions 
(also called an advisory referendum) of voters.60 For instance, in 1998 
Idaho voters were asked whether term limits should be repealed, after 
the United States Supreme Court ruled that term limits no longer ap-
plied to Congress.61 That question stated: “Since the United States Su-
preme Court has ruled that Idaho's 1994 term limits law does not apply 
to members of Congress, shall term limits for state elected officials, 
state legislators, county elected officials, city elected officials and school 
district trustees remain in place?”62 
                                                       
 
 
 57. City of Boise v. Keep the Commandments Coal., 141 P.3d 1123, 1125, 143 Idaho 
254, 256 (2006), quoting Weldon v. Bonnor County Tax Coalition, 124 Idaho 31, 38, 855 P.2d 
868, 875 (1993).  
 58. City of Boise v. Keep the Commandments Coal., 141 P.3d 1123, 1125, 143 Idaho 
254, 256 (2006) (“If a subject is legislative in nature, it is appropriate for action by initiative. 
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what is legislative in nature, as opposed to administrative in nature.”). 
 59. See, e.g., id.; Weldon v. Bonner Cnty. Tax Coal., 855 P.2d 868, 124 Idaho 31 
(1993); Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 661 P.2d 1214, 104 Idaho 615 (1983); Perrault v. 
Robinson, 29 Idaho 267 (1916) . 
 60. In addition to the 1998 advisory question, a statewide advisory question has on-
ly occurred one other time. However, legislative referenda formed part of several term limits 
proposals from 1992 to 1999 in different forms, none of which became law. A legislative ref-
erendum is an act the legislature passes but which does not become effective until affirma-
tively approved by the voters in the next election. For a more indepth analysis of the differ-
ence between an advisory question/advisory referendum and a legislative referendum, see 
Initiative Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/initiative-referendum-and-recall-
overview.aspx (last visited May 25, 2016).  
 61. Ch. 255, § 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws 824, 824–825 (1998).  
 62. Id. 
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In that election, the voters answered the question: “yes.”63 
Conducting advisory votes is not provided for constitutionally or 
statutorily at the state level, and occurs by passing a bill directing the 
Secretary of State to cause a specified question to appear on the ballot. 
Since the vote is advisory in nature, the result of the vote is not binding 
on the legislature and does not change the law. 
III. THE HISTORY OF TERM LIMITS IN IDAHO 
A. Early Term Limits History 
 From statehood, all executive officers served two-year terms with-
out any limit.64 In 1944 the Constitution was amended to provide that 
the executive branch officers’ terms would be four years, provided how-
ever, that a sitting governor could not “succeed himself in office.”65 
When the legislature met the following year, it codified the four-year 
terms as well as the prohibition on the governor from succeeding him-
self, but it also clarified that after the passage of one full term out of 
office, a governor could again hold that office.66 After Republican Gover-
nor Robert E. Smylie was elected in 1954, he successfully pushed for an 
amendment lifting the constitutional restriction on sitting governors 
running for reelection.67 Thus, from 1946 to 1956 constitutional and 
statutory ballot access restrictions existed for Idaho’s governors.68 
 Governor Smylie was reelected for two additional consecutive 
                                                       
 
 
 63. IDAHO SEC’Y OF ST., Idaho General Election Results, SOS.IDAHO.GOV (Novem-
ber 3, 1998), http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/results/1998/general/98gnrslt.htm (last visited 
May 25, 2016). 
 64. IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 1 (amended in relevant part in 1944 & 1956). In 1927, 
the Idaho Supreme Court struck down a prior constitutional amendment that extended the 
length of terms from two to four years. They held that the question put to voters could be 
read to be contra to the actual constitutional language – four year terms vs. a term not to 
exceed four years. Lane v. Lukens, 283 P. 532, 48 Idaho 517, 521 (1929). 
 65. IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 1; IDAHO SEC’Y OF ST., Idaho Constitutional Amend-
ment History, SOS.IDAHO.GOV http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/hst40_50.htm (last visited 
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 66. IDAHO CODE § 34-203 (1945). 
 67. See Idaho Constitutional Amendment History, supra note 65. The lore is Gover-
nor Smylie made several deals with legislators to secure passage in the legislature and place 
the constitutional change on the ballot. One deal was with legislative Democratic power bro-
ker and advocate for north Idaho, Tom Boise, to reopen what is now Lewis-Clark State Col-
lege, in Lewiston, instead of reopening Albion State Normal School in Cassia County. Quade 
Kenyon, Former Idaho Governors Tell it Like it Was: Smylie, Andrus Soon Will Publish 
Books About Their Time in Office and How They Got Things Done, THE SPOKESMAN-REV. 
(June 29, 1994), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/1997/dec/22/former-idaho-governors-tell-
it-like-it-was-smylie/ (last visited May 25, 2016). 
 68. Governors C.A. “Doc” Robins and Len Jordan are the only governors who were 
not permitted to succeed themselves. 
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terms, three consecutive terms in total.69 However, and most significant-
ly, the companion 1945 statute implementing four-year terms and pro-
hibiting a governor from running for consecutive terms was not repealed 
until 1965.70 The title of the bill deleting the term limit prohibition, after 
Governor Smylie had twice been reelected, announced that the bill 
“DELETE[D] A PROVISION REPEALED BY CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT.”71 
 It is intellectually unfair to consider history, exclusively through 
the lens of modern judicial decisions. However, the juxtaposition of the 
1946 statutory imposition of gubernatorial term limits, its 1965 repeal, 
Governor Smylie’s two intervening candidacies and elections in which 
he succeeded himself, and modern judicial holdings regarding enforcea-
bility of statutory term limits, makes for interesting ruminations.72 
There was no apparent political, public, or legal consternation when 
Governor Smylie sought election—twice—contrary to Idaho’s statute. 
Rather, Idahoans appeared to believe that qualifications for holding 
elected office must be in the Constitution. Since that constitutional bal-
lot access limitation was repealed in 1956, neither the Governor nor the 
legislature were unduly troubled that the same limitation existed in 
statute. The 1965 legislation appeared to be a mere cleanup bill, not in-
tended as a shift in public policy.73 
 Years later in 1994, ballot access limitations would again be codi-
fied. When the 1994 Initiative was challenged in Idaho’s District and 
Supreme Court, it does not appear that Idaho’s prior messy legal history 
and legislative perspective regarding Governor Smylie’s candidacy and 
election were raised, nor addressed by the Court. 
 Governor Smylie ran for a fourth term, but was defeated in the Re-
publican primary by Don Samuelson.74 Term limits did not emerge 
again for another thirty years. 
                                                       
 
 
 69. See Idaho Blue Book, IDAHO SEC’Y OF ST. 64–65 (23d ed. 2015–16), 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/bluebook/index.html. 
 70. 1965 Idaho Sess. Laws 223; IDAHO CODE § 34-203 (1965). 
 71. 1965 Idaho Sess. Laws 223. 
 72. See generally, infra Part III.D. 
 73. I interviewed former Senator William C. Roden on April 12, 2016 by telephone. 
Senator Roden served in the Senate from 1960 through 1968. During his tenure in the Sen-
ate, he served in leadership, ultimately as the Senate Majority Leader. He confirmed the 
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proscription. 
 74. See supra note 69. 
2016 IDAHO’S MESSY HISTORY WITH TERM LIMITS: 




B. Legislative Term Limits Movement Comes to Idaho 
Idaho Republicans have controlled both houses of the legislature 
since 1960.75 Republican control, however, was never more in doubt than 
during the 51st Legislative Session from 1990 to 1992.76 Popular Demo-
crat Cecil Andrus was the Governor, and he was in his record-breaking 
fourth and final term in office.77 Both Idaho Congressional seats were 
held by Democrats,78 and the Idaho Senate was equally divided between 
Republicans and Democrats, 21-21.79 Republican C.L. “Butch” Otter, 
who presided over the Senate as Lieutenant Governor, broke a tie to 
organize and elect the Senate President Pro Tempore.80 It was in this 
historically divided and partisan environment that legislative term lim-
its first arrived at the Idaho Legislature in 1992. 
Two different term limit measures were introduced in the Idaho 
Senate in 1992. A proposed constitutional amendment, S.J. Res. 108, 
sought to limit elected officials in executive branch offices to two terms 
and those in the legislature to five consecutive terms.81 S.J. Res. 108 
was co-sponsored by Senator Jerry Thorne, a Republican, and Senator 
Claire Wetherell, a Democrat.82 A two-thirds supermajority was re-
quired for legislative passage, but S.J. Res. 108 failed to garner even a 
simple majority in the Senate.83 
The other measure, S.J. Memorial 116, called on the United States 
House of Representatives and Senate to amend the Constitution to limit 
terms in Congress.84 Republican Senate President Pro Tempore Michael 
D. Crapo sponsored the measure.85 He also ran for Congress that same 
year.86 S.J. Memorial 116 was adopted by both the Senate and the 
                                                       
 
 
 75. Id. at 199–201. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 63–64. 
 78. Id. at 51–52. 
 79. Id. at 199–201. 
 80. Breaking the tie in the President Pro Tempore race was the subject of litigation. 
The Republican caucus nominated Senator Crapo and the Democratic caucus nominated 
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 81. See supra notes 8–9. 
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House, with bipartisan support, although Republicans constituted a 
large majority of the “aye” votes.87 
The Republican presidential nominee has carried Idaho in every 
presidential election since 1968, and the election of 1992 was no excep-
tion.88 Just days after the 1992 general election, a drive for a term limits 
initiative petition began with Barbara Marsh, a Pocatello activist who 
was statewide coordinator for Independent Presidential candidate Ross 
Perot.89 United We Stand America, the Idaho chapter of Perot’s citizen 
action organization, spearheaded the petition drive. Media reports at 
the time indicate that the proposed initiative limited members of the 
Idaho and U.S. House of Representatives to six years of office, and Idaho 
and U.S. Senators to twelve years of service, and included salary and 
pension caps on state legislators.90 
In 1993 two more term limit bills were proposed. S1209a, co-
sponsored by Republican Senator Evan Frasure and Democratic Senator 
Wetherell, attempted to limit service to two terms in the U.S. Senate, 
and six terms in the U.S. House of Representatives.91 S1209a passed the 
Senate, but the House did not consider the legislation.92 The other bill, 
S1208, proposed to limit executive branch office holders to two terms, 
and Idaho state legislators to six consecutive terms. Also, S1208 granted 
the final approval to voters.93 S1208 passed the Senate.94 When Senator 
Frasure presented S1208 to the House State Affairs Committee,95 he 
told the committee that if the legislature did not pass this bill, a more 
restrictive Perot initiative could become law.96 Some committee mem-
bers felt that referring final enactment to the voters was improper, and 
some others felt the restrictions were inadequate. The legislation was 
not advanced from the House committee.97 
By mid-1993, United We Stand America-Idaho publicly acknowl-
edged that the effort to gather the 32,061 signatures needed to place the 
                                                       
 
 
 87. See supra notes 8–9. 
 88. Idaho Blue Book, supra note 69, at 285. 
 89. See Organizers: Perot Drive a Success, THE SPOKESMAN-REV., May 6, 1992, at 
B2; Perot Supporters Launch Term-Limit Drive, supra note 7. 
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initiative on the ballot was stalling.98 An offer of assistance for Marsh 
and United We Stand America-Idaho came from the newly-organized 
U.S. Term Limits.99 This national pro-term limits organization was cre-
ated by Howie Rich with support from Charles and David Koch, all 
wealthy supporters of Libertarian candidates and causes.100 The offer, 
however, was rebuffed by Marsh because U.S. Term Limits would not 
reveal all its financial sources.101 In the media, Marsh explained, “We’re 
going to stay poor and steady. . . . We don’t need any outside help.”102 
Marsh’s effort failed, but U.S. Term Limits were successful.103 
C. The 1994 Initiative 
During the 1994 legislative session, Senator Frasure returned 
again with two term limit bills. S1481 would limit the terms of the U.S. 
Senate and House if approved by the voters, but would not take effect 
until 25 states had similarly limited their federal delegation.104 S1530 
sought to limit service in Idaho’s legislative, county, municipal, and 
school district offices to 12 consecutive years.105 In spite of efforts to 
amend the bills on the Senate floor, both bills failed.106 
With these legislative failures, term limits supporters had little in 
their way to delay their initiative efforts. U.S. Term Limits had aban-
doned the Perot-backed petition, and formed and funded a new organi-
zation called Idahoans for Term Limits. Beau Parent, executive director 
of Idahoans for Term Limits, reported they had secured about 8,000 sig-
natures in March of 1994, well short of the 32,061 needed, when he 
spoke against Senator Frasure’s bills in the Senate State Affairs Com-
mittee.107 At the Republican State Convention in Lewiston that June, 
proposals to support Idahoans for Term Limits’ effort were presented, 
but all failed, meaning the effort proceeded without the endorsement of 
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the Idaho Republican Party.108 July 8, 1994 was the final date to secure 
signatures.109 Signature gatherers were successful, in large part, be-
cause of a push to gather signatures at the Boise River Festival just 
days before the deadline.110 As a result, the 1994 term-limit initiative 
appeared on the November general election ballot. Idahoans would de-
cide the term limits issue. 
With the 1994 Initiative on the ballot, elected leaders and candi-
dates began to settle in to their term-limit campaign position. Republi-
can Congressman Crapo opposed it.111 At a conference in Boise, he ex-
plained the effects the 1994 Initiative would have on local races and his 
belief that congressional term limits should be uniform across states.112 
His presentation persuaded his collegue in Congress Republican Senator 
Larry Craig to walk back on his prior public support.113 Democratic 
Congressman Larry LaRacco completely opposed term limits.114 His 
challenger, Republican Helen Chenoweth, vigorously supported them.115 
While stumping in north Idaho for Larry Echo Hawk, the Democrats’ 
nominee for governor in 1994, Governor Andrus predicted that Idaho-
an’s support for the 1994 Initiative would “run like the forest fires this 
summer.”116 His position, however, was nuanced, saying he supported 
term limits “down to the commissioner level.”117 Idaho voters, however, 
did not have that option on the ballot. 
November 8, 1994 was a successful day for term-limits supporters 
in Idaho. The voters enacted the Term Limits Act. This initiative limited 
ballot access for state elected officials to eight of the previous fifteen 
years; legislators to eight of the previous fifteen years; county commis-
sioners to six of the previous eleven years; any other county elected offi-
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115. She was successful in her run for Congress in 1994 and was reelected twice. 
Honoring her pledge to serve no more than three terms, she did not seek reelection in 2000. 
She passed away in an automobile accident in 2006, but her daughter reportedly told Con-
gressman Raúl Labrador that Congressman Chenoweth regretted making the term-limit 
pledge. Betsy Z. Russell, After seeing D.C., Labrador now backs term limits, THE 
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116. Term limits will hurt local level, THE SPOKESMAN-REV. Nov. 3 1994. 
117. Id. 
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cial to eight of the previous fifteen years; mayors to eight of the previous 
fifteen years; city councilors to eight of the previous fifteen years; and 
school district trustees to six of the previous eleven years.118  
Subsequent to that general election, however, public support began 
to wane. 
D. Idaho Judicial Determinations 
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion that 
altered the legislative and public conversation regarding term limits.119 
In short, Arkansas’s state constitution120 restrictions on congressional 
terms were struck down as a violation of Article I of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.121 
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton focused on state power over 
congressional representation, and whether the qualifications listed in 
the Constitution are exclusive.122 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that 
states may not add qualifications beyond those specified in the U.S. 
Constitution.123 The age, citizenship, and residency requirements set out 
in the Qualifications Clauses of the United States Constitution are the 
only requirements for those seeking congressional office.124 Allowing 
states to add requirements, without a constitutional amendment, violat-
ed fundamental democratic principles and was “inconsistent with the 
Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the peo-
ple of the United States.”125 Without a U.S. constitutional amendment, 
states could not impose term limits or other qualifications.126 The Su-
preme Court ruling in 1995 provided new hope for term limit opponents 
across the nation, including those in Idaho. 
During these years, states, courts, legislatures, political parties, 
and the general public struggled to determine their respective political, 
judicial, and legislative positions. For example, in 1994, the Idaho Re-
publican Party refused a platform plank supporting term limits, but in 
June 2000, its platform specifically opposed term limits.127 
In response to Thornton, term limits proponents in Idaho suc-
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cessfully placed another initiative on the ballot in 1996 (herein 1996 Ini-
tiative), which was adopted into law with a vote of 56.1%.128 The 1996 
Initiative enacted the Congressional Term Limits Act, which required 
non-incumbent candidates for Congress and the legislature to support 
amending the United States Constitution to allow for term limits and to 
vote in favor of such an amendment. Any candidate that would not 
make that pledge, the phrase “DECLINED TO SUPPORT TERM 
LIMITS” would be printed next to the candidate’s name on the ballot.129 
Incumbents faced a similar obligation and would be brandished with 
“DISREGARDED VOTERS’ INSTRUCTIONS ON TERM LIMITS” on 
the ballot for failing to comply.130 The 1996 Initiative was judicially 
challenged by then-Speaker Michael K. Simpson and Senate President 
Pro Tempore Jerry Twiggs, with a bipartisan group of eight other sitting 
legislators, and most of the law was found unconstitutional.131 
With the term limits pledged struck down, term limits propo-
nents successfully placed another initiative on the 1998 general election 
ballot (herein 1998 Initiative).132 The 1998 Initiative enacted the Term 
Limits Pledge Act, which gave candidates for Congress the option to 
sign a pledge to serve no more than three terms in the United States 
House of Representatives or two terms in the United States Senate.133 
Candidates who signed the Term Limits Pledge would have “Signed 
TERM LIMITS pledge to serve no more than” two or three terms, for the 
corresponding office.134 If a candidate signed the Term Limits Pledge but 
appeared on the ballot in violation of the pledge, that candidate would 
have “Broke TERM LIMITS pledge” placed next to their name on the 
ballot and on all state-sponsored educational material and ballot infor-
mation.135 The 1998 Initiative was adopted with 54.7% of the vote.136 
Like the 1996 Initiative, the Idaho Supreme Court also found the 1998 
Initiative to be unconstitutional before it affected any election.137 
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On that same general election ballot, voters were provided an 
advisory question, whether, in light of the Thornton decision, did they 
want to repeal term limits with the passage of H644.138 Governor Phil 
Batt allowed H644 to become law without his signature and the non-
binding question was placed on the 1998 General Election ballot.139 
When he returned H644 unsigned, Governor Batt, in his message to the 
legislature, noted that it appeared “the inclusion of local officials was a 
mistake,” and his hope that an “overwhelming vote either way would 
clarify” if Idahoans intended term limits for state and local offices.140 A 
more likely result, Governor Batt continued, is that “no clear majority of 
opinion will emerge, further clouding the issue.”141 
Idaho voters once again stated their support for term limits by an-
swering affirmatively—with a vote of 53.2%—to the advisory ques-
tion.142 However, with a narrower margin of support for term limits 
than in both the 1994 Initiative and the 1996 Initiative, Governor Batt’s 
prediction of more cloudiness around the issue of term limits proved 
true. 
With the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision of Simpson and Van 
Valkenburgh, in which the Court struck down two term-limit ballot-
disclosure pledges for candidates, the only legal challenge remaining 
was the direct attack of term limits as a violation of Idaho’s Constitu-
tion. 
In January 2000, Rudeen v. Cenarrusa was filed in Power County, 
Idaho.143 The District Court judge assigned to the case was Judge 
Smith, the 1994 chairman of the Idaho Republican Party.144 
The case, Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, involved twenty-two county, city, 
and school board trustee public elected officers who argued that Idaho’s 
term limits were an unconstitutional violation of the right to vote.145 The 
Plaintiffs focused on three particular provisions of the Idaho Term Lim-
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its Act: the first provision created term limits for elected county offi-
cials;146 another imposed limits on school district trustees;147 and the 
third limited access to the ballot for multi-term incumbents.148 These 
public officials argued that there is a fundamental right to suffrage in 
the Idaho Constitution, including the right to ballot access.149 In his de-
cision, Judge Smith ruled that the right of suffrage is a fundamental 
constitutional right in Idaho, specifically guaranteed by Article I, Sec-
tion 19.150 Judge Smith further determined that Idaho’s Constitution, 
judicial precedent, and historical proceedings of the Idaho’s constitution 
convention were evidence that the right of suffrage included the right to 
access the ballot to run for public office.151 Finally, Judge Smith provid-
ed an extensive explanation of constitutional procedure and judicial in-
terpretation, in which he concluded the right of suffrage can only be 
changed by a constitutional amendment, and the term limit law violated 
the Equal Protection clause of the Idaho Constitution.152 The District 
Court determined that the Term Limits Act was unconstitutional.153 
E. Raw Messy Politics 
The pending litigation before Judge Smith added an additional 
spark to an already contentious debate in Idaho’s Republican Party. At 
the Republican Party’s 2000 convention held in Pocatello, the Platform 
Committee passed a plank opposing term limits 30-7, and the Resolu-
tions Committee passed a resolution against term limits 29-3 without 
any vocal opposition.154 But the full convention only passed the platform 
plank by a vote of 162-155.155 
However, Governor Dirk Kempthorne, who during the prior elec-
tion had pledged to veto a complete repeal of term limits, left the con-
vention before the term limits plank and resolution were considered.156 
Term limits opponents believed the Governor had changed his mind on 
the issue, and they used this perception as an opportunity to push for-
ward with a vote on the plank. Governor Kempthorne was not there to 
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rebut. In contrast, proponents of term limits argued that the party 
should wait for a judicial ruling, Governor Kempthorne’s opposition was 
clear, and the people had spoken. They argued that a vote to repeal by 
the legislature would be considered an act of “self-protection.”157 Never-
theless, convention delegates approved the plank.158 
The following year, the Idaho Supreme Court heard the oral argu-
ments in the appeal of Rudeen v. Cenarrusa.159 At that point, all provi-
sions of the 1994 Initiative were under review, including the application 
of term limits to state legislators and elected state officials.160 On De-
cember 13, 2001, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision on term 
limits, and reversed Judge Smith’s grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Plaintiffs.161 That Court held that the right of suffrage did not include 
the right to hold public office.162 Additionally, the Court determined the 
Term Limits Act could add qualifications for this right to suffrage.163 
Third, the Court held there was no violation of Idaho’s equal protection 
provision.164 
The 2002 legislative session began. On the 8th legislative day, H425 
was introduced. Legislators were being asked to balance the voices of 
their constituents, their parties, their legislative leadership, their Gov-
ernor, Judge Smith’s opinion, and their state Supreme Court. 
In the end, during the 2002 legislative session, the House and Sen-
ate voted to repeal term limits.165 Governor Kempthorne vetoed the 
bill.166 In his veto message, the Governor cited the 1994 Initiative and 
the three subsequent votes as the basis for his veto.167 However, both the 




158. Id.  
159. 38 P.3d 598, 136 Idaho 560 (2001). 
160. Pete Hamblen and Stephen Safranek intervened on behalf of Citizens for Term 
Limits, and Dennis Colson intervened as an attorney for legislative respondents. Rudeen, 38 
P.3d at 601–02, 136 Idaho at 563–64. On September 26, 2000, the Idaho Supreme Court 
granted Speaker Newcomb and Senate President Pro Tempore Geddes’s motion to intervene 
in the appeal. See Intervenors-Respondents’ Brief, Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, Intervenors-
Respondents’ Brief (Oct. 18, 2001) (No. 26975). On October 23, 2001, the Idaho Supreme 
Court granted Republican State Treasurer Ron Crane and Democratic State Controller J.D. 
Williams’ motion to intervene in the appeal. Rudeen, 38 P.3d  at 602, 136 Idaho at 564. 
161. Rudeen, 38 P.3d 609, 136 Idaho 571.  
162.  Id. at 570, 136 Idaho 600.  
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. 
165.  Journal State H. 56, 2d Sess., at 57 (Idaho 2002); Journal State S. 56, 2d Sess., 
at 61 (Idaho 2002).   
166. Journal State H. 56, 2d Sess., at 81–82 (Idaho 2002). 
167. Id. 
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House and the Senate garnered the sufficient two-thirds vote to override 
the Governor’s veto, confirming the repeal of term limit laws.168 
A referendum petition began.169 Sufficient signatures were gath-
ered and certified.170 The term-limit question was returned to voters on 
the 2002 general election ballot.171 Voters were asked to accept or reject 
the legislature’s repeal.172 As the Secretary of State’s Election Division 
explained, “Rejection of H425, by this referendum will enact ballot ac-
cess restrictions that will have the practical effect of imposing term lim-
its on state elected officeholders, state legislative elected officeholders, 
county elected officeholders, and municipal elected officeholders and 
school board members.”173 
Term limit opponents used Idaho’s well respected retiring Secre-
tary of State, Pete T. Cenarrusa,174 as their spokesperson, and argued 
that the issue was one of voter rights.175 In contrast, the term limit pro-
ponents engaged in a passionate effort to reject the repeal. 
 
IV. WHY IDAHO REPEALED TERM LIMITS 
Mr. Reed writes that the imposition of term limits was a Republi-
can and Libertarian idea.176 I agree that many Republicans and Liber-
tarians supported term limits, but there was also support by many 
Democrats.177 
He also stated that repeal of term limits was a Republican idea, 
dreamed up to extend the political careers of senior Republican legisla-
tive leaders and without “reported precedent.”178 That is inconsistent 
with my memory and judgment. 
                                                       
 
 
168. Id. at 82; Journal State S. 56, 2d Sess., at 69 (Idaho 2002).   
169. Year 2002 Proposed Referendum, IDAHO SEC’Y OF STATE, (May 14, 2002), 





174. Mr. Cenarrusa was elected to the Idaho House of Representatives in 1950. He 
served as a Representative for sixteen years, and was Speaker of the House for six of those. 
He was appointed Secretary of State in 1967, and was re-elected seven times. In 2002, rather 
than running for another term, Mr. Cenarrusa supported his long-time deputy, Ben Ysursa.  
175.  Betsy Z. Russell, Supporters of term limit won’t go away, THE SPOKESMAN-REV. 
B1, Nov. 7, 2002. 
176. See generally Reed, supra note 1. 
177. See id., at 4–5. 
178. See id., at 25. Mr. Reed described the repeal of term limits in Idaho as an act 
without “reported precedent.” Although Idaho citizens had never before repealed term limits, 
Idaho has precedent of repeal and modification of other initiatives in other areas such as real 
property taxes and spending. 
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As a legislative leader who was directly involved with these events, 
this article now attempts to articulate some explanations and motiva-
tions for the repeal. Each factor is not dispositive, but when collectively 
analyzed presses back against the accusation of partisan self-interest. 
A. Substitution of Legislative Judgment 
It appears to me that if Idaho voters could directly amend Idaho’s 
constitution, Idaho would have term limits today. Other states that en-
acted term limits into their state constitution still have term limits, 
with one exception–Oregon.179 Since Idaho’s voters were limited to initi-
ated statutes, the legislature could amend or repeal those statutes. In 
part, the legislature repealed term limits because it could. Though 
brashly stated, the legislature substituted its judgment for the will of 
the people. Whether it should or not, is in the eye of the beholder. 
The legislature, however, was in a unique position to see the effects 
of term limits in other states, reasonably project those effects in Idaho, 
and understand the damage they would do at the local level. Public and 
scholarly discussion of their value and detrimental impact continues, 
years after enactment. For instance, newspaper editorials in several 
other states highlight their negative impact on their state’s govern-
ment.180 The political science literature on term limits has been equally 
unkind.181 If Idaho had a direct mechanism for an initiated constitution-
                                                       
 
 
179. Oregon passed an initiated constitutional amendment, which was later deter-
mined to violate the single subject rule and thus removed. See Taylor, supra note 34. 
180. See, e.g., Steve Sebelius, Reconsidering term limits won’t happen this year, THE 
LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.reviewjournal.com/columns-
blogs/steve-sebelius/reconsidering-term-limits-won-t-happen-year (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) 
(Term limits have “caused nothing but trouble ever since, and the state would be immeasur-
ably improved by [its] immediate repeal.”); Dan Haley, Term limits have failed, THE DENVER 
POST (May 4, 2008), http://www.denverpost.com/haley/ci_9124955 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) 
(“Term limits, much like junior high school and bell-bottom pants, have been a failed social 
experiment.”); Editorial: Term limits must end to improve Missouri legislature, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.stltoday.com/news/ 
opinion/columns/the-platform/editorial-term-limits-must-end-to-improve-missouri-
legislature/article_0b869219-366c-5380-87b2-3347f57c4409.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) 
(“The failure has been so spectacular that many early supporters of the concept . . . have 
come to realize that term limits have drained the Capitol of the brain power, institutional 
knowledge and collegiality needed to push complex issues forward over several years of de-
bate.”). 
181. See, e.g., Peverill Squire & Gary Moncrief, STATE LEGISLATURES TODAY: 
POLITICS UNDER THE DOMES (2d ed. 2015) (“[C]areful studies of term limits have identified 
some clear consequences. The most obvious is greater turnover in most term-limited legisla-
tures. And this, in turn, has led to instability in standing committee systems. [C]ommittees 
are a crucial element in the lawmaking process. The upshot is that the informational, delib-
erative and gatekeeping roles of the committees are undermined by term limits. Further-
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al amendment–and it had been used–Idaho would likely feel the nega-
tive effects of term limits today. 
B. Breadth of Application & Sweeping Impact  
The 1994 Initiative was the most comprehensive term limits statu-
tory scheme in the United States.182 No state enacted more sweeping 
restrictions at the local level.183 Idaho counties would have been hit par-
ticularly hard: 44 of 132 county commissioners, and 30 county sheriffs, 
29 county clerks, 24 county treasurers, 27 county assessors, and 34 
county coroners from Idaho’s 44 counties would not have been able to 
seek reelection to any county office in 2002.184 Certainly rural communi-
ties would have been dealt a substantial blow,185 at a level that holds 
significant responsibilities for the state.186 
If the drafters of Idaho’s term limits had excluded county, munici-
pal, and school board officials in the 1994 Initiative, the law would have 
been substantially similar to the remaining states with term limits, and 
Idaho might still have term limits. But voters had approved the very 
broad 1994 Initiative. The effect: nearly sixty percent of county officials 
would be barred from the ballot in 2002. 
My colleagues and I were keenly aware of and troubled by the like-
ly destructive impact on local and rural communities. This troubled the 
Idaho legislature. These concerns were the primary motivation for legis-
lative action. 
                                                                                                                                
 
 
more, strong evidence suggests that term limits put legislatures at a disadvantage in their 
relations with the executive branch.”). 
182. James B. Weatherby & Randy Staplius, GOVERNING IDAHO: POLITICS, POWER 
AND PEOPLE 210 (2005) (“Idaho’s term limits law…was radical, the most far reaching meas-
ure of its kind in the United States[.]”). 
183. Some states allow counties and municipalities to choose whether or not to im-
pose term limits. Others that have term limits have extended the length of those limits. See 
generally Chanon Bell & Jacqueline Byers, History of County Term Limits (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.naco.org/newsroom/pubs/Documents/County%20Management%20and%20Struct
ure/County%20Term%20Limits.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
184. Daniel A. Smith, Overturning Term Limits: The Legislature’s Own Private Ida-
ho?, 36 POL. SCI. & POL. 215, 216 (2003). 
185. Rural communities have fewer people who are able or willing to seek public of-
fice, particularly when the office has little to no compensation, but requires several hours a 
week of commitment or volunteer time. See e.g., Charles Mahtesian, How to get rid of excel-
lent public officials, GOVERNING vol. 11 no. 10, 25, 25–28 (July 1998) (Oneida County prose-
cutor, the only attorney in the county with a population of 3,600, would be barred from ap-
pearing on the ballot). 
186. See Weatherby & Staplius, supra note 182182, at 153. (“But despite the man-
dated nature of their existence, counties are central players in the governmental system. If 
counties did not [exist], the state [] would have to act.”). 
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C. Public Policy Considerations 
Term limits restrict the right to run for office. In Idaho, the law 
was not a complete ban, but severely inhibited access–leaving a write-in 
campaign as the only remaining option.187 Term limits are also anti-
democratic, because voters are denied the ability to have every candi-
date on the ballot. Justice Stevens wrote in the plurality opinion in 
Thornton that “the opportunity to be elected [is] open to all,” with “the 
critical postulate that sovereignty is vested in the people, and that sov-
ereignty confers on the people the right to choose freely their represent-
atives . . . .”188 Thornton decided only the narrow issue of whether “the 
[U.S.] Constitution forbids States to add to or alter the qualifications” 
for election to Congress.189 
In contrast, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to find that the 
right to suffrage includes the right to hold office.190 The Court explained 
that “[a] national search of the case law” revealed nothing to interpret 
suffrage so broadly.191 However, Rudeen failed to mention the Thornton 
holding that there is a close relationship between suffrage and the right 
to be on the ballot.192 
As a matter of public policy, term limits were a solution without a 
problem. Idaho historically has all the trademarks of a citizen legisla-
ture: part-time, low pay, and small staff.193 Another measure of legisla-
tive professionalism vis-à-vis a citizen legislature is the number of law-
yers in the legislature. In 2007, 15.2% of state legislators nationwide 
                                                       
 
 
187. IDAHO CODE § 34-907 (repealed 2002). 
188. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 794 (1995) (referencing Pow-
ell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
189. Id. at 787. 
190. Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 38 P.3d 598, 605, 136 Idaho 560, 567 (2001). 
191. Id. at 604, 136 Idaho at 566. 
192. The dissent in Thornton accuses Justice  Stevens’ plurality opinion of finding a 
right to run for office in Powell. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 879 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice 
Stevens’ responds that is not so, but the “[Qualifications] Clauses did . . . further the interest 
of the people of the entire Nation in keeping the door to the National Legislature open to 
merit of every description.” Thornton, 514 U.S. 794 at n.11. This, obviously, is not a right to 
run for office, but something closer to a right than Idaho Court found and certainly some-
thing at least worthy of of judicial consideration. 
193. Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June 1, 
2014), http://www. 
ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2016). NCLS categorizes Idaho among sixteen Gold or Gold Lite states: states most 
like a traditional citizen legislature. Id. Idaho is most likely placed in the Gold Lite category 
because Idaho’s legislative salary is much closer to the national median legislative salary 
than it is to the bottom. Id.  
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listed their occupation as lawyer.194 At current count there are 13 legis-
lators with a J.D. out of 105 state legislators, or 12.4%, a high water-
mark in recent memory.195 In 2002, when the repeal and veto override 
votes occurred, there were only two lawyers in the Idaho Senate.196 
Additionally, term limits increased the power of lobbyists and spe-
cial interest groups. In 2002, Boise State University professor of politi-
cal science, Professor Moncrief, testified before the House State Affairs 
Committee when H425 was considered.197 He shared a survey of lobby-
ists from states that had term limits. Professor Moncrief stated the sur-
vey showed that a comfortable majority of those lobbyists believed legis-
lators relied more on staff to write legislation, were less knowledgeable 
about issues, failed to follow parliamentary procedure, and paid less at-
tention to statewide issues.198 
By even greater margins, lobbyists thought the Governor, govern-
mental departments and agencies, and special interest groups had 
greater influence.199 Lobbyists admitted that they wielded greater power 
within this new legislative paradigm. Yet, 2002 Idaho polling showed 
that voters were less likely to support term limits if the effect gave lob-
byists greater power.200 
Regardless of term limit’s turnover impact, lobbyists remained. 
Term limits decimate legislative institutional memory, leaving institu-
tional government bureaucrats and lobbyists to provide their version of 
history and vision of the future. The result, an easier glide path to pas-
sage of special interest legislation, because there is little memory to ex-
plain prior legislative experience that resulted in a different approach. 
                                                       
 
 
194. Legislators’ Occupations in All States, 1976, 1986, 1993, 1995, 2007 (Percent-
ages), NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-
legislatures/legislator-occupations-national-data.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
195. Senate Membership, State of Idaho, 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/senate/membership.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); House Mem-
bership, State of Idaho, http://legislature.idaho.gov/house/membership.cfm (last visited Apr. 
10, 2016). As of April 10, 2016, twelve legislators are members of the Idaho State Bar, six 
serving in the Senate and six serving in the House. 
196. Senator James E. Risch and me. 




200.  John Watts, Idahoans Against Term Limits: A Public Opinion Survey Prepared 
for the Idahoans Against Term Limits (Sept. 1998). This private survey, commissioned by 
Idahoans Against Term Limits, is included with the permission of Steve Ahrens, who was 
then executive director of the Idaho Association of Commerce and Industry (IACI). IACI was 
one of the principal backers of Idahoans Against Term Limits’ anti-term limits efforts. 
Roughly 45% of respondents said they would reject term limit if it increased power of bu-
reaucrats and lobbyists. Compared to other responses in the polling, the charge of increasing 
the power of bureaucrats and lobbyists was the argument most likely to sway voters to op-
pose term limits. 
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D. Term Limit’s Benefits – Theory vs. Reality 
There are additional misconceptions about term limits and their ef-
fects. One argument states that term limits prevent career politicians. 
However, studies show that the problem of ‘career politicians’ does not 
exist in Idaho. The Idaho Legislature, for instance, has a significant 
turnover rate which has remained steady over time. In 1992, Professor 
Moncrief testified before the Idaho Senate State Affairs Committee re-
garding S.J. Res. 108. His premise: Idaho’s legislators are not long-time 
fixtures in the Capitol. To illustrate, he used the legislative class of 
1982.201 Of 21 House members elected in 1982, only six were still serv-
ing ten years later.202 Similarly, of 13 Senators elected to in 1982, only 
four were still serving the next decade.203 Professor Moncrief also fo-
cused on the years of 1978 to 1992. On any given year in that period, at 
least 73% of the Idaho Legislature had served less than five two-year 
terms.204 Professor Moncrief’s conclusions still hold true today, since 
86% of the Senate and 81% of the House have completed less than five 
consecutive terms in their respective body.205 
Term limit supporters also argue that term limits make elections 
more competitive, add diversity in the legislature, and limit the influ-
ence of special interest groups. A research fellow at Stanford University 
conducted a study to determine the accuracy of these claims.206 The re-
search resoundingly found none of these claims to be true.207 Term lim-
                                                       
 
 
201. Hearing on S.J. Res. 108 Before the S. State Affairs Comm., 51st Leg. 2nd Sess. 
at 160, 213 (Idaho 1992).  
202. See id. The last year of floterial districts in Idaho was 1992. For a discussion on 
floterial districts, see 81A C.J.S. States § 126 n. 3. Thus, in 1992 the House of Representa-
tives had eighty-four members at the time of Professor Moncrief’s presentation, instead of 
seventy as today. At some point during the ten years after their election in 1982, nine mem-
bers of the class lost a primary or a general election, nine left voluntarily (in some cases to 
run for other office), and one passed away. Therefore, the total percentage of the class re-
maining in the House was 28.6%, or 7.1% of the entire House. See id. 
203. See id. In 1992, because of floterial districts, the Idaho Senate had forty-two 
Senators, instead of the current thirty-five. Of the thirteen Senators elected in 1982, two or 
three lost a primary or a general election, five or six left voluntarily (in some cases to run for 
other office), and one passed away. Therefore, the total percentage of the class remaining in 
the Senate was 30.8%, or 9.5% of the entire Senate. 
204. Id. 
205. See supra note 195. The current average number of terms served is 3.3 terms in 
both the Senate and the House. 
206. Carson Bruno, Sacramento Spotlight: Comprehensive Good Governance Reform 
Part 2 – Eliminating Term Limits EUREKA (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://www.hoover.org/research/sacramento-spotlight-comprehensive-good-governance-
reform-part-2-eliminating-term-limits (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
207. Lazarus, Jeffrey, Term Limits’ Multiple Effects on State Legislators’ Career De-
cisions, 6 ST. POLITICS & POL’Y Q. 357 (2006) (“While term limits certainly do stop a legisla-
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its do not add competitiveness to elections nor limit the influence of spe-
cial interest groups.208 State legislative incumbents are in no more dan-
ger of losing seats today than pre-term limits and “open-seat races are 
not any more competitive under term limits than before.”209 Term limits 
also have no effect on diversity in the legislature when measured ideo-
logically or across a range of demographic characteristics.210 
E. Self-Protection, Hubris, or Candor 
Voting to repeal term limits was not an act of political self-
preservation. If that was the purpose, Idaho legislators were not very 
strategic. We could have insulated ourselves from an unpopular repeal 
by introducing H425 after the deadline to file declarations of candidacy. 
Instead, we knowingly introduced the repeal, held public hearings, 
voted on the repeal, received the Governor’s veto, and overrode the veto 
before – not after – legislative candidates filed for reelection. The win-
dow to file for office lasts two weeks often in the middle of March. When 
that deadline arrives, the legislature is typically in session or about to 
adjourn sine die. At that time, legislators return home to campaign for 
their respective party’s nomination in the May primary election.211 But 
in 2002, Speaker Bruce C. Newcomb introduced the bill the second week 
of the session, making term limits the first important issue of the ses-
sion.212 Once the legislature overrode Governor Kempthorne’s veto, 
H425 was the first bill to become law in 2002.213 
That year, the legislature adjourned sine die on March 14th.214 
Speaker Newcomb could have introduced the bill the last day after dec-
larations of candidacy closed, then stayed a week or two longer to shep-
herd a repeal bill through both houses, to the governor, and then over-
                                                                                                                                
 
 
tor from seeking re-election to a seat after a specified number of terms, I find that those that 
wish to pursue a long-term political career are not, in general stopped by term limits.”). 
208. Id. 
209. Seth E. Masket & Jeffery B. Lewis, A Return to Normalcy? Revisiting the Effects 
of Term Limits on Competitiveness and Spending in California Assembly Elections 7 ST. 
POLITICS & POL’Y Q. 20 (2007). This is because a serious competitor will wait to run for office 
when an incumbent is term limited out of running because the wait is usually only a few 
years. 
210. John M. Carey et al., The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New 
Survey of the 50 States 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 105 (2006). 
211. See Idaho Blue Book, supra note 69, at 203–04. (Dates the legislature adjourned 
sine die in election years during the era discussed in this article: March 15, 1996; March 23, 
1998; April 5, 2000; March 14, 2002; March 20, 2004). 
212. Vincent J. Schodolski, Term-limits repeal sparks a political revolution in Idaho, 
CHICAGO TRIB. (Mar. 2 2002), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-05-
02/news/0205020210_1_term-limits-issue-term-limits-idaho-house (last visited Apr. 10, 
2016). 
213. See supra note 22. 
214. See supra note 211. 
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ride the veto. If so, then opponents who would challenge an incumbent 
on the basis of their term-limit repeal vote would have to wait until the 
election cycle, two years later. 
In 2000, only 206 legislative candidates were on the ballot. In 2002, 
301 candidates ran for the legislature in a historically large number, in 
part due to the repeal of term limits.215 Legislators were electorally ex-
posed. Voters had every opportunity to personally challenge legislators 
that voted to repeal, both in the primary and general election. Voters 
were fully aware of every incumbent’s position on term limits. Further-
more, legislators voted to repeal just weeks before the filing deadline. 
Even with this reality, more than two-thirds of both bodies voted to re-
peal the 1994 Initiative. Of legislators who voted to override Governor 
Kempthorne’s veto of H425 and sought reelection, only eleven were de-
feated in 2002, but not all lost reelection because of their term limits 
vote.216 
F. Repeal & Political Opportunity 
In 2002, Idaho Republican legislative leadership was comprised of 
the Senate President Pro Tempore Robert L. Geddes, Majority Leader 
James E. Risch, Assistant Majority Leader John Sandy, and Majority 
Caucus Chairman Bart M. Davis in the Senate,217 and in the House, 
Speaker Newcomb, Majority Leader Frank Bruneel, Assistant Majority 
Leader Lawerence Denney, and Majority Caucus Chairman Dan 
                                                       
 
 
215. 2002 was the first election after redistricting, and more candidates often file to 
run after redistricting, in part because that process often creates open legislative positions 
and pits incumbents against each other. Although 301 candidates filed to run in 2002, it 
should be noted that in 2012, the first election after the next redistricting, an even slightly 
larger number of candidates filed for legislative office. Consequently, it is possible that the 
high number of 2002 legislative candidates is more a reflection of redistricting than the term 
limit repeal. See List of All Candidate Declarations for 2012, IDAHO SEC’Y OF STATE (May 11, 
2012), http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/candidat/2012_primary_candidates.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2016). 
216. Legislators that supported the veto override of H425 who lost reelection were: 
Senators Clyde Boatright, Darrel Deide, Grant Ipsen, Robbi King-Barrutia, and Moon 
Wheeler, and Representatives Janet Arave Aikele, Frank Bruneel, Twila Hornbeck, Kent 
Higgins, Don Pischner, and Cameron Wheeler. However, because it was the first election 
after redistricting, see id., several legislators lost because they were drawn into the same 
district as another legislator, to wit: Senator Wheeler, and Representatives Aikele, Horn-
beck, Cuddy, Higgins, and Wheeler. Additionally, another Senator lost reelection after a DUI 
arrest in early 2002. Then-Senator Kathy Sims was the only legislator in either body to vote 
for H425 in support of repeal but against veto override. She narrowly lost election running 
against Senator John Goedde, who voted for H425 and to override the veto, when both were 
drawn into the same district. Not included in this figure are two representatives who lost 
seeking seats in the Senate: Kent Kunz and Sher Sellman. 
217. Journal State S. 56, 2d Sess., at 269 (Idaho 2002). 
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Mader.218 Of the eight Republican leaders, Senator Sandy was the only 
one to vote against the veto override of H425.219 
The members of majority leadership who would have immediately 
benefited from repealing term limits were Senators Risch and Sandy, 
Speaker Newcomb, and Representatives Bruneel, Denney, and Mader. 
However, neither Senators Sandy and Risch, nor Representative Mader 
sought reelection, and Bruneel was not reelected in 2002.220 For at least 
three members of majority leadership it cannot be said that their vote to 
repeal term limits immediately advanced their political career. 
Term-limit supporters and critics of legislative repeal asserted that 
term limits would weed out career politicians, but a contrary result was 
foreseeable.221 If term limits remained in effect the incumbents serving 
as Secretary of State, Attorney General, and State Controller would be 
barred from running for any constitutional office in 2002, and the in-
cumbent Governor, State Treasurer, and Superintendent of Public In-
struction would be barred from running for any constitutional office in 
2006.222 However, many senior legislators were serious possible candi-
dates for these constitutional offices. The repeal of term limits actually 
limited higher political office opportunities for legislators. Also, if term 
limits remained, a large number of local government offices would have 
opened at the city and county level. With many elected officials restrict-
ed from running for the same office again, the 2002 election could have 
been an historic reshuffling of elected officials within other statewide 
and county and city offices. 
In addition, the Senate President Pro Tempore and House Speaker, 
often in consultation with other members of legislative leadership, ap-
pointed committee chairmen, and because the Idaho legislature has a 
strong committee system, chairmen of the standing committees wield 
significant power.223 Nearly twenty back-bench Republican legislators in 
their first or second term in office, particularly in the House, voted to 
                                                       
 
 
218. Journal State H. 56, 2d Sess., at iv (Idaho 2002). 
219. Id. at 82; Journal State S. 56, 2d Sess., at 69 (Idaho 2002). 
220. Senator Risch sought and won the Lieutenant Governor’s seat. Senator Sandy 
decided not to run for reelection. Representative Bruneel sought reelection but lost in the 
general election to Democrat Mike Mitchell. 
221. See supra Part IV.D. 
222. IDAHO CODE § 34-907 (repealed 2002). 
223. See Weatherby & Staplius, supra note 182. (“To understand the Idaho legisla-
tive process is to understand the crucial role committees play in the process. Deference is 
given to the committee system . . . This specialization in functions and responsibilities works 
because of the “lay” complexion of the Legislature and the strong tradition in support of the 
committee process engendered by the many years of Republican majority rule . . . In this 
committee-oriented system, committee chairs are very influential. They control the commit-
tee agenda . . . Committee chairs can single-handedly kill bills they do not like and rarely are 
they successfully challenged.”). 
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repeal term limits.224 A vote to uphold Governor Kempthorne’s veto of 
H425 in the House of Representatives would have opened every majority 
leadership position and nearly every chairmanship. This group of young 
Republican legislators stood to promptly advance into positions of power 
and influence in the legislature by keeping term limits. Instead, they 
voted against their immediate self-interest.225 
G. Voters’ Inconsistent Actions 
Although Idaho citizens overwhelmingly supported term limits, 
they nevertheless voted for legislators who opposed term limits and 
served more than three terms. A March 2015 poll of registered voters 
found 85% of Idahoans strongly support or somewhat support term lim-
its on Idaho officials.226 Idaho Republicans, Democrats, and Independ-
ents support term limits at essentially identical levels.227 However, the 
same poll shows that nearly 50% of Idahoans and 72% of Republicans 
have a favorable opinion of Governor Otter,228 who was reelected in No-
vember 2014 to a third consecutive term.229 
Former Senator Craig initially supported term limits, later 
changed his opinion,230 and still garnered significant support from Idaho 
voters, winning and serving three U.S. Senate terms.231 Senator Crapo, 
who has served in Congress since his election in 1992, is viewed favora-
bly by 55% of Idahoans and 68% of Republicans.232 Senator Crapo as 
recently as 2010—while seeking reelection for a third term to the Sen-
                                                       
 
 
224. Young House Republicans who voted to override the veto of H425: Representa-
tives Janet Arave Aikele, Sharon Block, Larry Bradford, Gary Collins, George Eskridge, 
Steve Hadley, Jim Clark, Todd Hammond, Kent Higgins, Wayne Kendall, Eulalie Teichert 
Langford, Shirley McKague, Mike Moyle, Del Raybould, Sher Sellman, Mary Lou Shephard, 
Bert Stevenson, Tom Trail, and Cameron Wheeler. 
225.  Former Representative Kent Kunz reminded me of this observation about 
young House Republicans. He recalls making this point on the House floor while debating in 
favor of H425.  
226. Bob Bernick, Idahoans Overwhelmingly Favor Term Limits for Legislators, 
IDAHO POLITICS WEEKLY (Apr. 5, 2015), http://idahopoliticsweekly.com/politics/221-idahoans-
overwhelmingly-favor-term-limits-for-legislators (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Nov 04, 2014 General Election Results: Statewide Totals, IDAHO SEC’Y OF STATE. 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/results/2014/General/statewide_totals.html (last visited Apr. 
14, 2016). 
230. Craig now opposes term limits, MOSCOW-PULLMAN DAILY NEWS, Oct. 21, 1994, 
at 4A; see also supra text accompanying notes 111-113.  
231. Craig, Larry Edwin, (1945- ), Biographical Directory of the United States Con-
gress http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=c000858 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2016). 
232. Bernick, supra note 226. 
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ate—said he personally does not think term limits are effective, but 
added that “if Idahoans indicate that they believe that that’s what we 
should do, I would support the wishes of Idahoans in moving that direc-
tion.”233 Voters in the Second Congressional District initially elected 
Congressman Simpson in 1998,234 the only candidate in the Primary or 
General Election of either party to not sign a term limits pledge that 
year.235 Since then, voters have comfortably reelected him eight times.236 
Concurrent with the 1994 Initiative approval, Idaho voters reelect-
ed then-Lieutenant Governor Otter to a third term,237 and four years 
later a fourth term to that office.238 Voters also elected Secretary of 
State Pete Cenarrusa who held that office since 1967, to his penultimate 
term in 1994,239 and his final term in 1998.240 Also in 1998, Idaho voters 
reelected Democrat J.D. Williams to a third term as State Controller, 
demonstrating their bi-partisan agnosticism regarding term limits.241 
Since the 2002 Referendum upholding the repeal of term limits, 
Idaho voters have elected Treasurer Ron Crane to a fifth term,242 Attor-
ney General Lawrence Wasden to a fourth term,243 and former Secretary 
of State Ben Ysursa to a third term.244 All of the foregoing examples 
demonstrate that Idaho voters may support term limits conceptually, 
but they do not vote against politicians for holding contrary views on 
term limits or seeking additional terms. 
Even if term limits seemed to enjoy sweeping bipartisan support in 
Idaho, the support appears to be in concept and not in application. Na-
                                                       
 
 
233. Transcript: iTownhall Meeting August 4, 2010, United States Senator Mike 
Crapo, http://www.crapo.senate.gov/documents/media/trans_ithownhall_08042010.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
234. Idaho General Election Results: November 3, 1998, supra note 63. 
235. B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Political Briefing; Another G.O.P. Primary, Another 
Term-Limits Test, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/22/us/political-briefing-another-gop-primary-another-term-
limits-test.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). (Then-Speaker Simpson’s Republican primary 
opponants for Congress, former Senators Dane Watkins and Ann Rydalch and then-
Representative Mark Stubbs, all signed a term limits pledge, as did his Democratic general 
election opponent former Congressman Richard Stallings.)  
236. Simpson, Michael K., (1950- ), Biographical Directory of the United States Con-
gress http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=s001148 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2016). 
237. Idaho General Election Results: November 8, 1994, supra note 86. 
238. Idaho General Election Results: November 3, 1998, supra note 63. 
239. Idaho General Election Results: November 8, 1994, supra note 86. 
240. Idaho General Election Results: November 3, 1998, supra note 63. 
241. Id. 
242. Nov 04, 2014 General Election Results: Statewide Totals, supra note 229. 
243. Id. 
244. November 2, 2010 General Election Results: Statewide Totals, IDAHO SEC’Y OF 
ST. http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/results/2010/General/tot_stwd.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 
2016). 
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tional pollsters have noticed a phenomenon where voters simultaneous-
ly hold unfavorable views of institutions, but generally favorable views 
of their representative in those institutions.245 This explains how Con-
gress can have a favorability rating of 14%,246 but 95% of incumbents 
are reelected.247 If voters know their representative’s name, they are 
even more likely to have a positive impression.248 
One possible explanation is voters want term limits on politicians 
they do not know or have the opportunity to elect. In a legislative body, 
the voter may be able to vote for a few of the members, but not members 
from the other side of the state or other side of the country. Voters have 
no electoral recourse against any representatives other than their own, 
although they are affected by the actions of all members of a legislative 
body. Therefore, just as the low favorability of Congress is not imputed 
to a voter’s own Congressman, it appears the conceptual desire for term 
limits likewise does not strongly apply to the offices for which a voter 
can vote. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The enactment and repeal of term limits in Idaho was indeed 
messy, but elegant. The voters, by initiative, had chosen to impose term 
limits. Overturning an initiated statute, drafted and enacted by the 
people, using their constitutionally protected power to legislate inde-
pendent from the legislature was certainly a complicating factor–
perceived as an act of hubris. For some, overturning the express will of 
the people will always be unpardonable heresy, even though the 2002 
Referendum vote affirmed repeal. 
                                                       
 
 
245. Elizabeth Mendes, Americans Down with Congress, OK With Own Representa-
tive, GALLUP (May 9, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162362/americans-down-congress-
own-representative.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2016) (“Although Americans overwhelmingly 
disapprove of the job Congress in general is doing, voters re-elect most members of Congress 
in every election. This phenomenon is partly explained by the finding that Americans have 
significantly more positive views of their own representative than they do of Congress over-
all.”). 
246. Rebecca Rifkin, 2014 U.S. Approval of Congress Remains Near All-Time Low, 
GALLUP (Dec. 15, 2014), http:// 
www.gallup.com/poll/180113/2014-approval-congress-remains-near-time-low.aspx (last visit-
ed Apr. 14, 2016) (Average for Congressional approval for 2014). 
247. Reelection Rates Over the Years, OpenSecrets.org, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
248. See Rifkin, supra note 246. ([T]hose who do not know their representative’s 
name hold him or her in lower regard. Thus, people who don’t know the name of their repre-
sentative may be evaluating that person largely on their generally negative feelings about 
how the broader institution is doing.). 
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In 2002, however, the legislature could see the likely adverse im-
pacts of term limits.249 Perhaps I overstate the good done by the repeal 
of the 1994 Initiative, the policy reasons, the veto override, and the suc-
cessful campaign in support of the rightness of the repeal. Although it 
may sound Pollyannaish, we believed in our votes. 
Like many of my legislative colleagues, I believed that my repeal 
and override votes might cost me not only my election, but any political 
future. To me and others, my repeal and override votes were not acts of 
political preservation or promotion, but an anticipatory death-knell. 
These votes were acts of courage, not brash acts of self-preservation. 
With hindsight’s benefit, it appears that many Idahoans supported 
term limits to get the rascals from other states out of Congress. Looking 
back–after the referendum’s defeat–it appears that Idahoans did not 
support the breadth of term-limit application. Instead, it turns out, they 
preferred the right to decide for themselves. 
President Ronald Reagan, after his presidency, supported the re-
peal of the 22nd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which imposes a 
presidential term limit. His stated reason: “I charge that the 22nd is a 
violation of the people’s right to vote for whomever they want.”250 
Idaho, with the assistance of the legislature, has preserved this 
right of suffrage–the right to vote for whomever they want. 
                                                       
 
 
249. As this article goes to print, Ronald Longmore, Bonneville County Clerk, just 
announced his retirement. Since 1979, Ron quietly, capably, and professionally performed 
his various duties. The County trusted him. There was never a scandal. There was never any 
doubt. Instead, he was diligent, year-after-year. Ron rarely contacted me for legislative assis-
tance, but when he did I knew it was vital. During the 2002 legislative session, he did not 
ask my position on term limits. Ron was about to lose his career, but his focus was on job 
performance not continuity. One day during that legislative session, I recall seeing him from 
afar at the Capitol, and then stating something like, “There’s Ron Longmore, Bonneville 
County’s long-time county clerk. In my opinion, he’s Exhibit ‘A’ for why term limits are bad 
public policy.” I still believe that. Ronald Longmore personifies diligent public service. 
250.  150 CONG. REC. 11,712 (2004) (Senator Tom Daschle quoting from personal cor-
respondence he received from President Reagan).  
